This video can not be played Why Man Utd are less likely to win when they have more of the ball...

Under Michael Carrick, Manchester United average only 1.5 points per game when they have more than 50% of the ball. When they have less than 50%, this number shoots up to 2.6. And if you drop possession further, to 45% or below, United have won 10 games out of the past 10 since Carrick took the job. It is a staggering correlation but it brings the Englishman to the same crossroads that former United manager Ole Gunnar Solskjaer found himself at.

How do you bridge the game from a seemingly elite counter-attacking side to one capable of beating teams that give you the ball? The answer has long eluded United. Going down to 10 men on the way to a 1-0 derby defeat is far from ideal, but at full-time Manchester City manager Enzo Maresca offered a different perspective.

"We had a plan for 11 versus 11, but after the red card the game completely changed, but also for them. They love transitions and space in behind, but the game became more difficult. We just dropped, [offering] no space in behind and no more transitions, which is why the game was also more difficult for them." This was an astute analysis of United's most recent game as well as their team this year.

As divisive as the phrase "United DNA" is, it undoubtedly remains a key part of the conversation about United both externally and internally. This is because certain coaches have leaned into the club's roots, while others have tried but failed to move away from those ideas.

"We want to win; we want to be excited - that's why we love this club. I'm fully aware that we need to do it in a certain way," said Carrick when asked what style of football he wanted his United side to play. Here he echoed the sentiment of United's most successful manager, Sir Alex Ferguson, who in 2017 said: "You have a duty to entertain. We have to always remember there's a public to be entertained."

With excitement seemingly non-negotiable for Ferguson, it is obvious why fans and players of that era resonate with a United that create spectacles. Dynamic, direct and open games are sought after to remain connected to a United they recognise. Solskjaer's side embodied United's DNA before Ruben Amorim looked to play a more choreographed and risk-averse style of play. Carrick went back in the opposite direction.

Having established the context, we can take a closer look at how this has manifested on the pitch. With the messaging around Carrick's style of play being one of proactivity, excitement and directness, it is no surprise that United look better with space to attack – something that happens more often for a team with less of the ball.

The strengths of the squad are suited to this approach, with goalkeeper Senne Lammens a good long kicker of the ball. In defenders Harry Maguire and Lisandro Martinez, United have punchy progressive passers from deep too.

In attack, Marcus Rashford is a willing runner in behind, often moving into a striker position despite starting on the wing. The same can be said for Bryan Mbeumo. Bruno Fernandes, central to all of this, is a strong passer when attacking in transition, finding runners ahead of him – a role in which he broke the Premier League assist record last term.

Bruno Fernandes recorded 21 Premier League assists last season, in large part because of how Michael Carrick platformed him. Carrick has also provided certain players a level of freedom to make their own decisions on the pitch. "Giving Bruno the platform to go and perform [has helped him]," Carrick said in April. "We're trying to create a structure to try to bring out the best of everyone, but I like seeing Bruno in attacking positions with a bit of freedom."

Although players may enjoy this responsibility, how the team play can be swayed by individual players' natural tendencies. With more risk-taking, direct passers in the side, when United are asked to disorganise stubborn defences their long-standing habits can mean losing the ball more often. When dominating the ball, breaking down a team requires strong one-against-one wingers. Defending teams often clog the centre of the pitch, as City did in the derby, forcing the attacking side to the flank.

City's Jeremy Doku, Arsenal's Bukayo Saka, Bayern Munich's Michael Olise and Paris St-Germain's Khvicha Kvaratskhelia have been key in helping those sides win often – while keeping the ball.

This season United have used a 4-2-4 shape in possession. The full-backs have pushed up and taken turns with the wingers to hold wide or narrow positions. This, however, often results in Luke Shaw, Patrick Dorgu, Diogo Dalot and Mbeumo – not the strongest one-v-one dribblers - isolated on the wing.

Amorim used a system without wingers and the squad built as a result – with the exception of Rashford and Amad Diallo – appear underprepared to create chances from out wide. With wide play an area of concern, play is often funnelled back infield. Carrick has primarily used Fernandes and Matheus Cunha as a floating front two, both with licence to drop deep or pull wider.

Both players are more suited to facing the opposition's goal, rather than playing with their back to goal in small spaces, which makes it hard for United to capitalise through the middle. City's Rayan Cherki and Arsenal's Kai Havertz are players suited to this role, albeit in different ways.

Fernandes and Cunha's quality means they can still be effective in these positions, often forming triangles with the full-back and wingers, helping United get into the final third. But as they both vacate the striker position, United end up lacking bodies in the box when they play crosses in.

In this example against Ipswich, highlighted are Bruno Fernandes and Cunha, United's front two. Both have dropped deep and moved towards the ball. As the move reaches the final third, Dalot shoots from distance. The two central attackers are not able to get into the box soon enough, meaning United lack options in the box.

The best teams have repeatable methods of chance creation in the final third that suit their players' strengths. Teams then cycle through these depending on what the opposition are offering them. With United's attackers given more freedom, they often seem to be looking to solutions during the game more reactively compared to the more repeatable methods of creation Maresca can fall back on.

With United struggling to beat teams that allow them the ball, their impressive set-pieces provided them with a workaround last season. Since Carrick took over, 56% of United's opening goals have come from corners, free-kicks or penalties, and 28% from Casemiro's headers.

Casemiro's nine Premier League goals last season – mainly from set-plays – were key for United to unlock defences. After scoring, opponents are more likely to attack, which stretches the game, allowing United to play to their strengths and in a more direct fashion.

This season they have not shown that same prowess and, although Casemiro is known for his defending, the loss of his ability to help open the scoring makes United's attacking concerns against deep defences a more pressing issue to address.

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